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The Unitary Finding and the Threat of School Resegregation:
Riddick v. School Board
There are competing interests lurking beneath the complex litigation sur-
rounding the desegregation of America's public schools. Some parents, typically
white, have wished to send their children to well-established neighborhood
schools. Other parents, usually black, have filed class action suits so that their
children would receive a better education than has been available in their own
neighborhood schools. Because of the disparity in the different school systems,
the desegregation of public schools has taken place in a volatile, sometimes pon-
derous manner.1
The experience of school desegregation in Norfolk, Virginia illustrates these
problems. In Riddick v. School Board2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit had before it a constitutional challenge to a new pupil assign-
ment plan proposed by the Norfolk School Board that called for the elimination
of mandatory cross-town busing of elementary school students.3 Because the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had ruled in
1975 that Norfolk had achieved a unitary school system,4 the court of appeals
held that plaintiffs had the burden of proving discriminatory intent on the part
of the Board in formulating its new plan.5 The court further held that plaintiffs
failed to meet the requisite burden of proof and failed to establish a discrimina-
tory motive on the part of the Board.6 Thus the court restricted a remedy-
busing-that had been an approved method of school desegregation for approxi-
mately fifteen years.7
The effort to integrate public schools in Norfolk began almost thirty years
1. Perhaps the best, and certainly one of the most poignant, treatments of the beginnings of
school desegregation in America is R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); see also J.
DURAM, A MODERATE AMONG EXTREMISTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND THE SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION CRISIS (1981) (discussing the Eisenhower administration's response to the Supreme
Court-ordered school desegregation in the 1950s); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976) (advocating the maintenance of a
neighborhood school system); J. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DE-
MOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984) (arguing that only drastic desegregative change,
not partial movements, will be of benefit to minorities and Anglos); G. METCALF, FROM LITTLE
ROCK TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983) (a history of school desegre-
gation).
There are also many useful collections of essays on school desegregation. See, eg., SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (1980); SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: SHADOW
AND SUBSTANCE (1976); THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983).
2. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
3. For other provisions of the plan, see infra text accompanying notes 16-20.
4. Beckett v. School Bd., No. 2214 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1975), quoted in Riddick v. School Bd.,
627 F. Supp. 814, 818 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420
(1986); see infra note 12 and accompanying text.
5. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538.
6. Id. at 543; see infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
7. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); infra notes 60-69 and
accompanying text (discussing Swann and the use of busing in school desegregation).
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prior to the decision in Riddick in Adkins v. School Board (Beckett).8 When the
Fourth Circuit in 1970 found that Norfolk still had a dual school system based
on race,9 it ordered a plan to rid the school system of all vestiges of segrega-
tion. 0 In 1972 the Fourth Circuit approved a desegregation plan that made use
of the pairing and clustering of Norfolk schools, provided for mandatory cross-
town busing of students, and required the Board to file annual reports on the
school system's progress toward desegregation.1 1 Between 1972 and 1975 the
Norfolk school system, operating under this court-approved plan, made such
strides toward desegregation that the district court dismissed the Beckett action
in 1975. Because the original plan had eliminated racial discrimination from the
system, the court determined that the school system had become unitary.' 2
For the next several years the Board continued to follow the plan ordered
by the district court. By 1980 black student enrollment in the Norfolk school
system had declined steadily; white student enrollment had declined precip-
itously.13 Faced with an alarming rate of "white flight"'14 and a notable decline
8. 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957) (Adkins was combined with the nearly identical case of Beckett v. School Bd. and will be
hereinafter cited as Beckett). In Beckett the district court held chapter 70, the Pupil Assignment
Plan proposed by the Virginia General Assembly, unconstitutional. Id. at 436. There was over-
whelming evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the general assembly, whose plan called
for strict segregation of Virginia's public schools in violation of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). For a further discussion of the Virginia General Assembly's resistance to Brown, see
infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text. With the intervention of additional plaintiffs, the case
became styled Brewer v. School Bd., 349 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1965).
9. Brewer v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408, 410 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
10. In Brewer the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered the district
court to implement a plan to achieve a unitary school system in Norfolk. Id. at 412. For a discus-
sion of the School Board's proposed plan in 1970, see infra text accompanying notes 200-02. Follow-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971), the court of appeals once again remanded Brewer so that the district court could oversee the
implementation of a desegregation plan conforming with Swann's expanded scope of remedies. Ad-
ams v. School Dist. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971) (per curiam) (court of
appeals remanded ten school desegregation cases in this one opinion, including Brewer).
11. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525. The court of appeals also modified the busing plan to provide
free bus transportation for bused students. See Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); see also infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (discussing
Brewer).
12. The full text of the district court's 1975 order, declaring the Norfolk school system "uni-
tary," is as follows:
It appearing to the Court that all issues in this action have been disposed of, that the
School Board of the City of Norfolk has satisfied its affirmative duty to desegregate, that
racial discrimination through official action has been eliminated from the system, and that
the Norfolk School System is now "unitary," the Court doth accordingly ORDER AND
DECREE that this action is hereby dismissed, with leave to any party to reinstate this
action for good cause shown.
Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 818-19 (quoting Beckett v. School Bd., No. 2214 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1975)).
13. In 1970 there were 56,830 students in the Norfolk school system-57% white and 43%
black. By 1983 the total number of students had declined to 34,803-42% white and 58% black.
One side-effect of the large decline in the numbers of white students was the partial resegregation of
the Norfolk school system. In 1977 there was one elementary school with black enrollment above
70%7, but the number had increased to 7 by 1981. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525-26.
14. Although the white population in Norfolk had declined 24% between 1970 and 1983, white
student enrollment in the public schools declined 52% during that same period. Id. at 525. For the
court of appeal's treatment of white flight, see infra text accompanying notes 39-40. White flight was
not only a problem subsequent to the 1975 unitary order. The phenomenon had been present in the
Norfolk school system prior to the institution of the original court-ordered plan in 1972 as well as
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in parental involvement in the public schools,15 the Board developed an alterna-
tive plan. The Board's "Proposal for a Voluntary Stably Desegregated School
System" eliminated busing of elementary school students. 16 The plan also pro-
vided for elementary students to attend neighborhood schools, and the Board
gerrymandered these "single attendance zones" to achieve maximum racial inte-
gration. 17 By continuing busing for grades seven through twelve and providing
a feeder plan from the elementary schools into the city's eight junior high
schools, the plan continued integration in secondary schools. I8 In addition, the
plan contained a majority-minority transfer option, 19 multi-cultural programs,
and a program to encourage parental involvement.20 The Board sought district
court approval of its plan by filing a motion to reinstate the Beckett case and by
filing a new civil action. 21 When the Riddick plaintiffs filed a class action suit to
challenge the proposed plan, the Board withdrew its motion and voluntarily dis-
missed the action it had filed. 22
The district court ruled favorably on the Board's voluntary desegregation
plan when it held that its 1975 order declaring the system unitary meant the
Norfolk School Board had discharged its affirmative duty to desegregate its
schools. 23 Thus, the district court held, the burden of proof now rested on
plaintiffs to show the Board acted with discriminatory intent in proposing the
new plan.24 The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their
burden of proving such intent because the Board's voluntary plan directly ad-
dressed both the resegregation threatened by whites leaving the public schools
and the need to renew parental involvement in the system.25 The court refused
to infer discriminatory intent because it found the Board had employed thor-
ough and reasonable procedures. 26
between 1972 and 1975. Black students were leaving the school system from 1975 through 1983 at a
more gradual rate. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 541 n.18.
15. As evidence of the drastic drop in parental involvement, the district court found that PTA
membership had dropped dramatically, from 15,000-20,000 parents to 3,500 parents. Riddick, 784
F.2d at 526.
16. Id. at 526-27.
17. Id. at 527.
18. Id.
19. Under this option any student attending a school in which children of his or her race consti-
tuted over 70% of the student body would be able to transfer to a school where his or her race
constituted less than 50% of the students. Transferring children would receive free transportation.
Id. The Supreme Court had recognized this mechanism in an earlier decision. See Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971); infra note 65.
20. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 527. A second plan that reduced the length of bus rides for elemen-
tary school students, but increased the number of students bused, did not receive public support. Id.
at 527-28.
21. Id. at 525.
22. Id.
23. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 820 ("This Court holds that ... a [unitary] finding was fully
justified in 1975 and remains a finding which is today fully justified.").
24. Id. The court reached this conclusion by adopting the reasoning of Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing Washington and Arlington
Heights).
25. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 827.
26. Id. at 825. The district court noted that the Board had established a special committee,
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Plaintiffs claimed error by the district court on four bases. First, they chal-
lenged the effectiveness of the 1975 court order, which declared that Norfolk
had achieved a unitary system. Plaintiffs urged the court to consider the unitary
order a consent order rather than a final order.27 The Riddick court of appeals,
however, reasoned that the matter had been fully litigated twenty years prior to
1975 and that the unitary order was a final order. Thus, the order put an end to
the litigation, and the court concluded that principles of collateral estoppel ap-
plied to the case. 28 Rejecting plaintiffs' claim that they were denied a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the unitary finding, the Riddick court ruled that the
Beckett plaintiffs' failure to appeal the unitary order precluded the Riddick
plaintiffs from contesting that order.29
A second ground on which the Riddick plaintiffs attacked the district court
holding was the court's finding that Norfolk still had a unitary school system
eight years after the 1975 unitary finding. Applying a test for unitariness set out
in Green v. School Board,30 the court of appeals determined that the Norfolk
school system was fully integrated with respect to pupil assignment as well as
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.3 1 The
court ruled that the district court's findings of fact were not "clearly errone-
ous"'32 and so upheld the lower court's finding that the Norfolk school system
hired experts, and held six public hearings. Id. The employment of reasonable procedures, however,
does not necessarily refute an inference of subjective discriminatory intent. For example, in Keyes v.
School Dist. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, noted the difficulties faced
by a court in ascertaining "the subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken or
not taken over many years .....".Id. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a further discussion of Justice Powell's opinion in Keyes, see infra notes 89-98 and accompany-
ing text.
The district court also denied plaintiffs' contention that the Board acted in concert with local
housing authority officials to create coterminous housing projects and black elementary school
zones. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 825-27. See generally Note, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for
Interdistrict School Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J. 340 (1983) (reviewing cases that raised
the issue of a causal relationship between housing discrimination and school segregation).
27. By this argument plaintiffs sought a ruling that the 1975 consent order did not have collat-
eral estoppel effect. Plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court's argument in United States v. Interna-
tional Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953), that a compromise judgment entered with the consent of both
parties does not necessarily have collateral estoppel effect. Id. at 506. The Riddick court of appeals,
however, rejected plaintiffs' characterization of the 1975 order as such a compromise judgment.
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530.
28. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530-31. The court found there was sufficient privity between the
Beckett and Riddick plaintiffs for principles of issue preclusion to apply. Id. at 532. Plaintiffs had
argued that the 1975 unitary order was not a final order, because the action was "'dismissed, with
leave to any party to reinstate this action for good cause shown.'" Id. at 530-31 (quoting Beckett v.
School Bd., No. 2214 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1975)). Despite this language, the court of appeals did not
allow the Riddick plaintiffs to challenge the unitary order. Id. at 532.
29. Id. at 531. The court overlooked the fact the Beckett plaintiffs had no occasion to contest
the unitary order so long as the Norfolk School Board was operating the school system in good faith
under the original plan, as it had done until the time of Riddick. It was not until the Board at-
tempted to modify the original court-ordered plan that plaintiffs had occasion to challenge the
Board's actions.
30. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). For a discussion of Green, see infra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text.
31. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 532-34. The court applied the several factors-enumerated in
Green-that established the existence of a unitary school system.
32. In so ruling the Riddick court applied the standard enumerated in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
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still retained its unitary status.33
The third basis of appeal constituted what the Riddick court regarded as
the "principal issue" in the case: whether the finding that Norfolk's school sys-
tem was a unitary system had the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the
Board to the plaintiffs. That is, did the finding of a unitary system give plaintiffs
the burden of proving a discriminatory intent on the part of the Board in devel-
oping the new plan. The Riddick plaintiffs claimed that the burden of proof
should remain on the Board "to prove that implementation of the new assign-
ment plan will not perpetuate the vestiges of the past de jure dual system."3 4
However, relying on the de jure/de facto distinction that it stated "is the law," 35
the court of appeals held that once the school system had achieved unitary status
and eliminated segregation, the burden of proof was on plaintiffs to show dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the Board in proposing its new plan.
36
Last, the Riddick plaintiffs contended that they had met their burden of
proof by showing the Board had acted with a discriminatory purpose. The court
of appeals, however, rejected plaintiffs' assignments of error of law and fact in
the district court's decision.37 For example, plaintiffs contended that the district
court erred in allowing the Board to consider white flight as a reason for aban-
doning busing of elementary school students.38 In response, the court of appeals
noted that several federal circuit courts had allowed consideration of white flight
in the formulation and adoption of school desegregation plans, 39 so long as the
erroneous ...."). The court relied on other school desegregation cases which have held that
"[f]actual findings by a district court in school desegregation cases, especially where the presiding
judicial officer has lived with the case for many years, are entitled to great deference on review."
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.6 (1979)
(district court judges who "have lived with the case over the years" have a good grasp of the facts);
Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 990 (4th Cir. 1985) (deference to factual findings of
district court); Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 327-28
(4th Cir. 1984) (district court better able to "separate the wheat from the chaff"). But cf. Diaz v.
San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1984) ("firm conviction" that district
court's conclusion that its findings did not compel a conclusion of segregative intent was erroneous),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th
Cir. 1981) (district court's finding that the school system was unitary was "clearly erroneous"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
33. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533-34.
34. Id. at 534.
35. Id. at 534 n.14. De jure segregation "refers to segregation directly intended or mandated by
law or otherwise issuing from an official racial classification or in other words to segregation which
has or had the sanction of law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, de
facto segregation "is inadvertent and without assistance of school authorities and not caused by any
state action but rather by social, economic and other determinates." Id. at 375. For criticism of the
distinction by courts and commentators, see infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
36. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538. In reaching this conclusion the court of appeals relied on the
reasoning of Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), and Spangler v. Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra notes
106-13 and accompanying text.
37. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539-43.
38. Id. at 539.
39. See Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d 952, 957 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984); Liddell v.
Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1313-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Johnson v. Board of
Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1979); Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir.
1979); Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1976); Higgins v. Board of
Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 793-94 (6th Cir. 1974).
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use of such a defense by school boards was not "'a smokescreen to avoid inte-
gration.' 40 The Riddick court further rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the
concept of a neighborhood school system "in and of itself"'4 1 and the statistical
impact of the plan-which would increase the number of one-race schools in
Norfolk42-were violative of the United States Constitution. The court also
found substantial evidence to support the lower court's conclusion that the
Board's concern over the decline in parental involvement in the Norfolk school
system was not a pretext for racial discrimination. 43 The court concluded that
the Board's plan was a reasonable, voluntary attempt to achieve a "stably inte-
grated" system in Norfolk. 44
According to the Riddick court, "the school boards and not the federal
courts will run the schools."'45 This judicial attitude represents the culmination
of a steady departure from opinions expressed in prior school desegregation
cases. The impetus for school desegregation came from the United States
Supreme Court's landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,4 6
which toppled the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. Fergu-
son.
4 7 No longer would the federal courts recognize state laws, mostly in the
South, which sanctioned segregation of the public schools. The Court found
such segregation deprived blacks of equal protection of law.48 In determining
the manner of relief due under Brown, the Court gave school authorities "pri-
mary responsibility" for solving local school problems. 49 The federal courts, on
the other hand, possessed broad power to employ equitable principles to deter-
mine whether school board actions "[constituted] good faith implementation of
the governing constitutional principles."'50 The decision empowered courts to
consider the adequacy of steps taken toward desegregation, including plans pro-
40. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539 (quoting Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 794 (6th Cir.
1974)).
41. Id. at 540.
42. Id. at 543. Under the Board's proposed plan, 12 of Norfolk's 36 elementary schools would
become 70% or more black, compared to 4 under the court-ordered busing plan in effect at the time.
Ten of those twelve schools would be 95% or more black. Six schools would become 70% or more
white. Id. at 527.
43. Id. at 541-42. The court of appeals also upheld the district court's findings on the remain-
der of plaintiffs' assignments of error, including the reasonableness of procedures employed by the
Board and the failure to find concert of action between the Board and the housing authority. Id. at
542-43; see supra note 26.
44. Riddiek, 784 F.2d at 543. The court limited the applicability of its decision to those school
boards that had eradicated de jure segregation and maintained a unitary system: "Our holding is a
limited one, applicable only to those school systems which have succeeded in eradicating all vestiges
of de jure segregation. In those systems, the school boards and not the federal courts will run the
schools, absent a showing of an intent to discriminate." Id.
45. Id.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a person of
mixed race who had violated Louisiana law by refusing to leave his seat in a railroad coach reserved
for whites. The Court thus upheld the law, which required "equal but separate accommodations"
for "white" and "colored" passengers. Id. at 540. According to the Court's unanimous decision in
Brown I, "(s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
48. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II).
50. Id.
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posed by school boards.5 1 The Court ordered the district courts to ensure that
segregated school systems provided for the admission of black students "on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed." 52
Over the next decade it became clear that school boards across the South
were acting more deliberately than speedily. For example, in Green the Supreme
Court held that the School Board of a rural county in Virginia had not estab-
lished an effective plan for desegregation as required by Brown.5 3 The Court
found the Board's "freedom of choice" plan54 simply had perpetuated existing
segregation with respect to several facets of the public school system.5 5 The
Court noted that Brown represented only a "first step" toward breaking from the
tradition of segregation in public education. The "ultimate end" to be achieved
with any desegregation plan, the Court noted, is a "unitary, nonracial system of
public education."' 56 School boards were "charged with the affirmative duty...
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be elimi-
nated root and branch."'57 In achieving that goal a school board had to "come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realisti-
cally to work now." 58 The Green decision required, however, that courts retain
jurisdiction until school boards had met the "heavy burden" of discharging that
duty. 59
That the federal courts' retention of jurisdiction often led to complex litiga-
tion over school desegregation is evident from the experience of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school system in North Carolina. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education 60 the Supreme Court further elaborated on the broad
scope of courts' equitable powers in formulating remedies for school desegrega-
51. Id. at 300-01.
52. Id. at 301. The court placed the burden of proving that additional time was necessary on
school boards. Id. at 300.
53. Green, 391 U.S. at 441. The Supreme Court at the same time decided two companion cases
in which school boards had not developed effective plans to desegregate their school systems. See
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (Gould, Arkansas); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391
U.S. 450 (1968) (Jackson, Tennessee).
54. In this bifurcated school system, which had previously had one white combined elementary
and high school and one black combined elementary and high school, students under the Board's
proposed plan were to select annually which school they wished to attend. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-
34. Not surprisingly, few students changed schools, and the only ones who did so were black.
Eighty-five percent of the black children still remained in the all-black school. Id. at 441. The effect
of the plan was "simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II
placed squarely on the School Board." Id. at 441-42.
55. The Court found there was racial identification in the school system with regard to the
composition of the student body, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facili-
ties. Id. at 435. The Riddick court looked to these factors, first identified in Green, to determine
whether the Norfolk school system was unitary. See supra text accompanying note 31.
56. Green, 391 U.S. at 436.
57. Id. at 437-38.
58. Id. at 439.
59. Id.
60. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a summary of the desegregation efforts in the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg system prior to the Supreme Court decision, see id. at 6-11. The personal reflections of a
Charlotte newspaper reporter on mandatory school busing in the city can be found in Barrows,
School Busing: Charlotte, N.C., in THE GREAT SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY 261 (N. Mills ed.
1973).
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tion.61 The Court's discussion centered on an ambitious school desegregation
plan for student assignment, which the district court had ordered.62 First, be-
cause the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board had defaulted in proposing its
own plan,6 3 the Court approved the lower court's use of racial quotas as "a
starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible re-
quirement." 6 Second, the Court allowed "some small number" of one-race
schools in the system, so long as they did not result from discrimination on the
part of the Board. 65
An important element of the court-ordered pupil assignment plan in Swann
was the widespread bus transportation of students.66 The Court considered bus-
ing "a normal and accepted tool of educational policy."'67 It was also a neces-
sary tool, because assignments of children to neighborhood schools did not, and
presumably could not, dismantle the dual system in Charlotte.68 Although the
Court in Swann found the district court's pupil assignment plan reasonable, its
opinion contained dictum to the effect that after a school system became unitary
neither school authorities nor district courts would be constitutionally required
to readjust racial composition of student bodies from year to year.69
61. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. According to the Court in Swann, "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy. In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer
acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary
school system." Id.
62. The so-called "Finger plan" (named after the court-appointed expert who formulated it)
required the pairing of predominantly black inner-city elementary schools with predominantly white
outlying residential elementary schools, and the busing of students in one area to schools in the other
area. Thus, the plan called for widespread cross-town busing of elementary school students. Id. at
9-10. Less than enthusiastic, the School Board "acquiesced" in a plan it nonetheless considered
unreasonable. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Id. at 25-26. According to the Supreme Court, an optional majority-to-minority provision,
was
an indispensable remedy for those students willing to transfer to other schools in order to
lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma of segregation. In order to be effec-
tive, such a transfer arrangement must grant the transferring student free transportation
and space must be made available in the school to which he desires to move.
Id. at 26-27.
66. Id. at 29-31. The Court also approved the pairing and clustering of schools from different
attendance zones as a "remedial [adjustment] to eliminate the dual school systems." Id. at 28. This
remedial altering of attendance zones made busing more necessary to achieve desegregation of the
school system. See supra note 62.
67. Swann, 402 U.S. at 29.
68. Id. at 30. The only proper objection to busing, the Court ruled, was that the time or dis-
tance traveled would be such as to risk children's health or "significantly impinge on the educational
process." Id. at 30-31.
69. According to the Supreme Court:
It does not follow that the communities served by [unitary] systems will remain demo-
graphically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school authori-
ties nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the sys-
tem. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future
problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other
agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect
the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be
necessary.
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The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Swann was to grant district
courts broad powers to shape remedies for school systems that had previously
been segregated by law.70 Thereafter, courts began to confront the problem of
fashioning remedies for school systems that had become segregated because of
residential patterns or other demographic factors.7 1 Cases decided after Swann
reflected the manner in which courts treated school desegregation as it evolved
from a problem affecting blacks into one affecting other minorities as well, and
from a regional into a national problem.
In Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District72 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court order im-
posing a new student assignment plan73 on a school system in which black and
Mexican-American school children were segregated from white children. 74 The
issue in Cisneros was whether the segregation of children by imposing neighbor-
hood schools on already segregated residential patterns-as opposed to statuto-
rily mandated segregation-was permissible under the Constitution. 75 The
court's resounding answer was that state action caused segregation as it had
developed in Corpus Christi. School board policies that allowed the continua-
tion of such segregation created "dual school systems that cannot be somehow
less odious because they do not flow from a statutory source."' 76
To reach this conclusion the Cisneros court rejected the "anodyne dichot-
omy" of de facto and de jure segregation. 77 The School Board's actions and
Id. at 31-32.
70. See supra note 35 (defining de jure segregation).
71. See supra note 35 (defining de facto segregation).
72. 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
73. The plan resembled that adopted in Swann. See id. at 147.
74. Corpus Christi presented a significant challenge to the court of appeals. White children
historically had attended neighborhood schools. Because officials traditionally had classified Mexi-
can-Americans as whites, Mexican-Americans attended schools in their own neighborhoods as well.
Exacerbating the problem was the fact the neighborhoods in Corpus Christi were segregated, with
blacks and Mexican-Americans concentrated in an area known as the "Mexican corridor." Id. at
146. The result was that, by the time the Mexican-American and black citizens brought this class
action suit, students were "locked" into "racially and ethnically homogeneous" schools in nonwhite
areas of the city. Id. at 146-47. The district court had provided the impetus to end this situation by
finding in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970), supple-
mental opinion, 330 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd in part and modified in part, 467 F.2d 142
(5th Cir. 1972), "that [M]exican-[A]mericans constituted an identifiable, ethnic-minority group enti-
tled to the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equality in public education .... " Cisneros, 467
F.2d at 147.
75. Cisneros, 467 F.2d at 144.
76. Id. at 148.
77. Id. The Cisneros court quoted at length from a dissent in one of its earlier decisions:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or any
other area of the nation which the opinion classifies under de facto segregation, would
receive little comfort from the assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does
not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society, while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system in the 17 Southern and border states
violates the constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even their blood brothers, be-
cause they were born into a de jure society."
Id. (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir.) (Gewn,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967)).
It is unclear how the dle jure/de facto distinction arose in the context of school desegregation
cases before the Supreme Court prior to its use in Keyes v. School Dist. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). For
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policies, which included the construction and renovation of new schools in such
a way as to perpetuate segregation 78 and the assignment of black and Mexican-
American teachers in disparate ratios to these segregated schools, 79 had the ef-
fect of continuing segregation. The Cisneros court found discriminatory motive
or purpose was not necessary for there to be a violation of the constitutional
rights of minority school children when state action had brought about segrega-
tion.80 Thus, the court held that "the racial and ethnic segregation that exists in
the Corpus Christi school system is unconstitutional-not de facto, not de jure,
but unconstitutional." 81
a discussion of Keyes, see ifra notes 82-98 and accompanying text. Until the early 1970s the school
desegregation decisions by and large applied to southern school districts, which had engaged in dejure segregation. The Supreme Court in Swann alluded to de facto segregation, Swann, 402 U.S. at
17-18, and Justice Douglas made reference to the possibility of de facto segregation in three cases,
twice in brief dissenting opinions. See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1031 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("But there can be defacto segregation without the State's being implicated in the crea-
tion of the dual system .... "); Gomperti v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1971) ("The remedies, if
any, that are available where school segregation is defacto and not dejure are not yet clear."); Deal
v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 962, 962 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I would remand this
case so that evidence can be made part of the record and the lower courts can rule on the issues of dejure and de facto segregation of the races that are presented."). For a general discussion of the
development of the de facto doctrine in school desegregation cases, see Goodman, De Facto School
Desegregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 276-78 (1972).
78. The Court in Swann referred to selective school construction as a "potent weapon for creat-
ing or maintaining a state-segregated school system." Swann, 402 U.S. at 21.
79. Cisneros, 467 F.2d at 149.
80, Id. In reaching this conclusion the Cisneros court relied on the reasoning of a prior
Supreme Court decision, Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). In Wright the
Supreme Court confronted the question whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit had employed a proper test in determining a school board's intent. Under the "dominant
purpose" test the court of appeals had found that the Board's primary purpose in creating a new
school district was "not 'merely a cover-up' for racial discrimination" and thus the creation of the
district was not a violation of its affirmative duty to desegregate. Id. at 461 (quoting Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir. 1971)).
The Supreme Court in Wright, however, flatly rejected the "dominant purpose" test:
This "dominant purpose" test finds no precedent in our decisions. It is true that where an
action by school authorities is motivated by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the
existence of that purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of the action by intensifying
the stigma of implied racial inferiority.... But as we said in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217, 225, it "is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant'
motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators," and the same may be said of the
choices of a school board.... Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or
motivation-of a school board's action in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system. The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an
action that has an impermissible effect.
Id. at 461-62 (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971)).
In a later decision, the Supreme Court explained its holding in Wright. In Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976), the Court indicated that a law's racial impact, rather than its
discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor only "in proper circumstances." For a discussion of
Washington, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The Court also reinstated a requirement
of discriminatory intent in a later case. See Keyes v. School Dist. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); infra notes
82-98 and accompanying text (discussing Keyes).
81. Cisneros, 467 F.2d at 149. The court of appeals in Cisneros noted a series of other cases it
had decided that focused on the unlawful discriminatory effects of state action. Id. at 150 (citing Lee
v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); Stout v. United States, 448 F.2d 403(5th Cir. 1971); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 915
(1969); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904(1969); Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940(1969); and United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)).
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In Keyes v. School District 1,82 however, the Supreme Court continued the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. According to the majority
opinion in Keyes, "the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-
called de facto segregation... is purpose or intent to segregate." 8 3 The Court
took an expansive view of the evidence 84 to hold that "a finding of intentionally
segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system...
creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not
adventitious? ' 85 Having found that the Denver School Board encouraged delib-
erate racial segregation in schools attended by over one-third of the black stu-
dents in the city, the Court recognized "a prima facie case of intentional
segregation in the core city schools."'8 6 By this innovative reasoning, the
Supreme Court in Keyes refused to base its holding on the effects test suggested
in Wright v. Council of Emporia8 7 and instead found discriminatory intent by
implication."8
In a separate opinion in Keyes Justice Powell called for the eradication of "a
doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time." 89 Justice Powell traced the
evolution of school desegregation decisions from the time of Brown-when the
de jure/de facto distinction was "consistent with the limited constitutional ra-
tionale of that case" 9 -- to the time of Swann-when the "root cause" of segre-
gated schools in metropolitan areas, southern and northern, was segregation in
"residential and migratory patterns." 91 Justice Powell proposed that courts
adopt "a uniform, constitutional approach to our national problem of school
segregation." 92 Rather than relying on the de jure/de facto distinction and re-
For a discussion of more recent decisions from the Fifth Circuit, see infra text accompanying notes
131-37.
82. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Plaintiffs in Keyes proved the existence of de jure segregative policies
by the Denver School Board with respect to the Park Hill area of the city. The district court,
however, had held that plaintiffs had to make a separate finding of de jure segregation for each of the
other segregated areas in Denver. Id. at 192-93. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when
plaintiffs had proven discriminatory intent by the Board with respect to one area of the city, the
burden shifted to the Board to show that its actions with respect to the system's other segregated
schools was not likewise motivated by segregative intent. Id. at 208-09.
83. Id. at 208.
84. See id. at 205-08.
85. Id. at 208. For further discussion of the "Keyes presumption," see infra notes 122-24 and
accompanying text.
86. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213.
87. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). For a discussion of Wright, see supra note 80.
88. The Court rejected the Denver School Board's argument that residential patterns, and not
"purposefully segregative pAicies," had led to segregation in the other areas:
We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a "neighborhood school policy" of
itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school
authorities have committed acts constituting dejure segregation. It is enough that we hold
that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dispositive where, as in this case, the school
authorities have been found to have practiced dejure segregation in a meaningful portion
of the school system by techniques that indicate that the "neighborhood school" concept
has not been maintained free of manipulation.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 212.
89. Id. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 220 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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quiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent even under a relaxed standard,
Justice Powell's approach would instead hold that when segregated schools exist
within a school district "to a substantial degree,"' 93 there is a prima facie case of
a constitutional violation. 94 In such a situation the burden would be on the
school board to demonstrate it was operating an integrated school system.95
Comparing the Court's application of the effects approach in Wright 96 with that
of the majority in Keyes, Justice Powell wrote, "I can discern no basis in law or
logic for holding that the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in Vir-
ginia and controlling in Colorado."' 97 This, according to Justice Powell, bore
out his conclusion that relying on the de jure/de facto distinction would lead to
"fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious" results. 98
Despite Justice Powell's objections, the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis99 subsequently held that a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent on
the part of government officials for there to be an equal protection violation
under the fourteenth amendment.I ° ° Although the Court indicated that, ac-
cording to Wright, "in proper circumstances, the racial impact of a law, rather
than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor,"' 0 1 that decision did not
alter what the Court called the "prevailing rule"-as expressed by the majority
93. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell recognized
that such a term would be imprecise, but argued this was desirable because conditions varied widely
among school districts: "The existence of a substantial percentage of schools populated by students
from one race only or predominantly so populated, should trigger the inquiry." Id. at 224 n.10
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 232, 235 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. For a discussion of Wright, see supra note 80.
97. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 231 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice
Powell the results often would be "arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken or not taken over many years."
Id. He concluded that such results would not be in the best interests of minority school children.
"Any test resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a school board's segregative 'intent'
provides inadequate assurance that minority children will not be short-changed in the decisions of
those entrusted with the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools." Id. at 227 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell also disagreed sharply with busing as an
effective remedy to achieve desegregation. See id. at 236-52 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Like Justice Powell, Justice Douglas expressed his opposition to the de jure/de facto distinction:
"I think it is time to state that there is no constitutional difference between de jure and de facto
segregation, for each is the product of state actions or policies." Id. at 216 (Douglas, J., writing
separately).
In his dissenting opinion Justice Rehnquist also noted the difficulty of "[assessing) the inten-
tions with which official acts of a school board are performed over a period of years." Id. at 261
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Although Washington involved allegedly discriminatory hiring prac-
tices by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, the Court's opinion emphasized
the importance of proving discriminatory intent in school desegregation cases. Id. at 240, 243-44.
100. Id. at 238-39.
101. Id. at 243. In allowing racial impact to remain as a measure of an equal protection viola-
tion "in proper circumstances," the Supreme Court has allowed the inquiry to turn on the facts of a
specific case. This has led to continuing uncertainty in predicting the outcome of school desegrega-
tion cases. See. e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). For a discussion of Columbus and Dayton, see infra notes 114-24
and accompanying text.
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in Keyes-which required proof of "purposeful discrimination." 1 0 2 In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 10 3 the Supreme
Court again reasoned that discriminatory impact, although a useful starting
point, was not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.1° 4 Other evidence a
court must examine, in addition to the discriminatory impact of an official act,
includes the historical background that led to the allegedly discriminatory act,
"particularly if [that background] reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes." 10 5
The problem that arose in school desegregation cases by the mid-1970s was
that, as twenty years of flagrantly discriminatory acts in violation of Brown
slowly receded into the background, courts' powers to enforce school desegrega-
tion remedies showed signs of receding as well. Perhaps the most significant
step toward limiting federal court supervision over school desegregation oc-
curred in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler.10 6 In 1974 the
Pasadena Board brought suit to eliminate a provision of a 1970 court-ordered
desegregation plan 107 and to terminate the district court's "retained jurisdic-
tion" over the Board's actions. 10 8 The Supreme Court held that the district
court had exceeded its authority by requiring annual readjustment of attendance
zones by the Board to comply with the literal requirements of the plan. 10 9 The
School Board had achieved a unitary system in Pasadena, 110 and Swann con-
ceived of school desegregation plans as a "'starting point,'" not an "'inflexible
102. Washington, 426 U.S. at 243-44. In a concurring opinion Justice Stevens voiced his con-
cerns over the sweeping language of the majority in requiring proof of discriminatory intent in differ-
ent contexts, and then reflected on the difficulties of actually proving such intent:
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually
happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds.
This is particularly true in the case of governmental action which is frequently the product
of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. It is unrealistic, on
the one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjec-
tive intent of the decisionmaker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action
simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the deci-
sional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist
voted for it.
Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Riddick court relied on both Washington, an employment dis-
crimination case, and Arlington Heights, a housing discrimination case, to require plaintiffs to show
that the Norfolk School Board acted with discriminatory intent, because de jure segregation was no
longer present in the school system. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 528.
104. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
105. Id. at 267. For a discussion of evidence of historical background, see infra notes 196-208
and accompanying text.
106. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
107. The Board sought to eliminate a rule in the "Pasadena Plan" that there be "no majority of
any minority" students in any school within the district. The Board. after its compliance with the
original order in 1970, failed to readjust attendance zones, so that by the time of the suit 5 of 32
schools no longer strictly met the requirements of the rule. Id. at 431.
108. Id. at 429. Alternatively, the Board sought court approval of its own proposed modifica-
tions of the "Pasadena Plan." Id.
109. Id. at 434-35. For other discussion of the issue of changing demographics, see supra note 69
and accompanying text.
110. Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 435.
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requirement.' " The Court concluded that the district court, "having once
implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern .... had fully performed its
function of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discrimina-
tory attendance patterns." 1 12 In 1979 the federal courts returned control of
Pasadena's school system once and for all to the Board. 113
That same year, however, the Supreme Court revived uncertainty over the
proof required to show discriminatory intent in school desegregation cases. In
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick 114 and Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman 115 the Court held that each of the defendant school boards had inten-
tionally violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by
operating dual school systems at the time of Brown and by their subsequent
actions, which had continuing, severe discriminatory effects on the respective
school systems. 116 In Dayton the Court emphasized the discriminatory effects of
the School Board's actions, which had resulted in fifty-one of the sixty-nine
schools in the system being "virtually all white or all black": 117
Part of the affirmative duty imposed by our cases, as we decided
in Wright, .. . is the obligation not to take any action that would im-
pede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects....
111. Id. at 434 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 25). For a discussion of Swann, see supra text
accompanying notes 60-69.
112. Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 436-37. According to one commentator, the holding in Pasadena
was a narrow one because the trial judge had taken an "obviously inappropriate" step by "[asserting]
the power to maintain a particular racial balance in the schools 'in perpetuity,' without regard to
whether the affirmative duty to desegregate had already been 'accomplished' and a 'unitary system'
already achieved." Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLuM. L. REV. 728, 791 (1986).
Not only was the holding in Pasadena narrow, but subsequent decisions have limited its applica-
bility. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1980), for example, the court
rejected the Michigan State Board of Education's reliance on Pasadena:
It is true that the Court [in Pasadena] held that if, under a court-ordered desegregation
plan, a school system reaches a state of constitutional grace with respect to desegregation,
it is not required to make changes in student assignments where there has been a subse-
quent change in the racial mix in the schools caused by factors for which the school board
could not be considered responsible .... Pasadena did not, however, hold that a district
court did not have the authority and duty to order such ancillary programs [as were in-
volved in Oliver] if such were found to be necessary to cure the effects on the black children
of the prior unconstitutional school segregation.
Id. at 787.
In Pasadena, in which the School Board had complied with the strict requirements of the "no
majority of any minority" plan for but one year, there was no showing that changes in the racial mix
of the schools were caused by any segregative actions of the School Board. Pasadena, 427 U.S. at
435-36. This passive role of the Pasadena Board contrasts with the situation in Norfolk, where the
Board's actions led to shifting the racial composition of the schools. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537; see
infra note 180.
113. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit brought to an end the district court's supervision of the
Pasadena Unified School District by rejecting the district court's argument that "avoidable 'resegre-
gation'" might occur in Pasadena. Id. at 1240-42. The Pasadena Board's revised version of the
"Pasadena Plan" constituted a "full and complete remedy" that "establish[ed] a racially neutral and
hence constitutional method of student selection." Id. at 1243 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
115. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
116. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 463-64; Dayton, 443 U.S. at 534-35.
117. Dayton, 443 U.S. at 529.
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The Dayton Board, however, had engaged in many post-Brown actions
that had the effect of increasing or perpetuating segregation.' 18
According to the Court, the Columbus School Board had intentionally
maintained" 'an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side'" of the
city. 1 9 The Court found that the Board "knowingly continued its failure to
eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally segregative policies." 120 The
Court also upheld the district court's findings, which supported plaintiffs' argu-
ment that an inference of discriminatory intent could be drawn from the Board's
actions:121
Nor do we perceive any misuse [by the district court in finding
evidence of discriminatory intent] of Keyes, where we held that pur-
poseful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system fur-
nishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide
discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted, and that given the
purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection
between such a purpose and racial separation in other parts of the
school system. There was no undue reliance here on the inferences
permitted by Keyes, or upon those recognized by Swann. 122
Dissenting from both opinions, Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority's hold-
ings in Columbus and Dayton called into question the validity of the de jure/de
facto distinction 123 and struck a blow against school boards' ability to rebut the
"Keyes 'presumption.' 1124
118. Id. at 538.
119. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 457-58 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,
236 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443
U.S. 449 (1979)).
120. Id. at 461.
121. Id. at 465-66.
Adherence to a particular policy or practice, "with full knowledge of the predictable effects
of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among many
others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of segrega-
tive intent should be drawn."... The District Court thus stayed well within the require-
ments of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights.
Id. at 465 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Ed., 429 F. Supp. 229, 225 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd in
part and remanded in part, 583 F. 2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)).
122. Id. at 467-68.
123. According to Justice Rehnquist the Court's approach in Columbus and Dayton "would all
but eliminate the distinction between defacto and dejure segregation and render all school systems
captives of a remote and ambiguous past." Id. at 491 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Dayton,
443 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's cascade of presumptions... sweeps away
the distinction between defacto and dejure segregation.").
124. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 506 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator has explained the
significance of the "Keyes presumption" as follows:
The Court [in Keyes] has held that once the plaintiff makes a specific threshold showing
that the defendant purposefully segregated in at least a substantial part of the school sys-
tem, it will be presumed (rebuttably) that present segregated patterns throughout the
school system were caused by the defendant's discrimination. This rebuttable presump-
tion-commonly called the "Keyes presumption"-has facilitated findings of extensive seg-
regative effects and therefore has provided a predicate for extensive desegregation
remedies.
Gewirtz, supra note 112, at 785.
Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's holdings in Columbus and Dayton for this very reason:
"IT]he Court today endorses views regarding the neighborhood school policy and racially identifi-
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Against this complex and at times contradictory background, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Riddick ruled that control of
the Norfolk school system had reverted to the Norfolk School Board as a result
of the 1975 order finding the system unitary.1 25 The effect of that crucial finding
was to shift the burden of proof of discriminatory intent to the plaintiffs. 126
Although prior decisions had empowered district courts to desegregate public
schools, t27 the Riddick court sought to determine when it was appropriate for
courts to relinquish such authority, absent a showing of discriminatory in-
tent.1 28 In upholding the view that judicial involvement should effectively end
when a school system achieves unitary status, the court found Norfolk had
reached the point, anticipated in Green, when "state-imposed segregation has
been completely removed."' 129 But not all federal courts have agreed with the
Riddick court either in its conclusion that a unitary finding signifies the termina-
tion of a court's jurisdiction over a school system that had practiced de jure
segregation, or in its shifting of the burden of proof to plaintiffs once a finding of
a unitary system has been made. 130
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has on numerous
occasions determined the effect of a unitary finding on school desegregation
cases. 131 In 1971 the court vacated a district court's order that had dismissed a
Leon County, Florida school desegregation case on a finding that the system was
able neighborhoods that essentially make the Keyes presumption irrebuttable." Columbus, 443 U.S.
at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text (discussing Keyes).
125. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on its recent decision
in Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985): "'Once a school system has achieved
unitary status, a court may not order further relief to counter-act[sic] resegregation that does not
result from the school system's intentionally discriminatory acts.'" Riddick, 784 F.2d at 536 (quot-
ing Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 988).
In Vaughns, however, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the
case for new findings regarding the County's special education and "TAG" (talented and gifted)
programs. This was done because the district court had "failed to give effect to the presumption to
which plaintiffs were entitled and which it was the Board's burden to overcome that present racial
disparities are causally related to the prior unconstitutional segregation." Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 986.
The court in Riddick did not grant the plaintiffs before it this same presumption based on prior
discriminatory acts by the School Board. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. Instead,
the court held the 10-year-old unitary order entitled the Board to overcome any such presumption.
See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538.
126. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537.
127. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 13, 14; Green, 391 U.S. at 439; Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 299-301 (1955) (Brown 11).
128. For a discussion of the termination of jurisdiction in school desegregation cases, see Note,
Retention of Jurisdiction in Desegregation Cases: A Causal and Attitudinal Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L.
Rcv. 195 (1978). The author suggests that desegregation orders in school systems that have cured
segregative conditions should be replaced with general injunctions against resegregation. Id. at 233.
129. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
130. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1522-23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 420 (1986); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983); Graves v.
Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (Former 5th Cir. 1982); Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1978); Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 767,
767-68 (5th Cir. 1971).
131. E.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 228 (5th Cir. 1983); Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1978); Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448
F.2d 767, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1971).
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unitary. 132 The court of appeals ordered the district court to reinstate the ac-
tion, retain jurisdiction for at least three more years, and require the school
district to file semi-annual reports on its progress toward desegregating the sys-
tem. 133 In 1978 the court of appeals affirmed the decision of a district court to
reopen a Baldwin County, Alabama school desegregation case even though the
court had entered a prior unitary order.' 34 Although the school system com-
plied with the unitary order's requirements by filing statistical reports, the dis-
trict court "did not ... enter final judgment or dismiss the case, so we assume
that it retained jurisdiction for purposes other than receiving the reports."'1 35 In
1983 the court of appeals upheld a district court determination that the Houston
Independent School District had achieved unitary status after twelve years of
operating under a court-ordered desegregation plan. 136 Although the school
system was unitary, the court of appeals approved the district court's retention
of supervision for three more years. 137
The Riddick court's decision differs markedly from the approach taken by
its companion court of appeals. By finding that the unitary order "culminated a
lengthy and hotly contested lawsuit which resulted in the ending of segregated
schools in Norfolk,"' 138 the Riddick court relinquished federal court supervision
over school desegregation in Norfolk despite the potential for resegregation
under the Board's new plan. Admittedly, the Riddick court declared itself
"[m]indful of the [Supreme] Court's admonition.., that '[un]reflective invoca-
tion of collateral estoppel against parties with an ongoing interest in constitu-
tional issues could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness to
changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical' . . . .,,139 Although
"mindful" of the possibility of freezing doctrine, the Riddick court may have
done just that by interpreting the unitary order as incontestable. 140
The difficulty with identifying the "culmination" of a school desegregation
case in a unitary finding lies in the fact a school board remains under a continu-
ous affirmative duty to desegregate its system. 14 1 In Graves v. Walton County
132. Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 767, 767 (5th Cir. 1971).
133. Id.
134. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978).
135. Id. at 82.
136. Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983).
137. Id. at 228.
138. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530.
139. Id. at 532 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979)).
140. One commentator has suggested that the Reagan Administration is supporting two avenues
federal courts are taking toward terminating their supervision of school desegregation cases: (1) the
Riddick approach of declaring a system "unitary" and no longer subject to judicial remedies; and (2)
the encouragement of settlements with school boards which provide that after three years of "good
faith" implementation of a plan the school system will be declared "unitary." Gewirtz, supra note
112, at 790-91. Gewirtz notes that the termination issue is "likely to become one of the most impor-
tant in the civil rights field." Id. at 790. Gewirtz also has suggested that the Riddick decision "sheds
little light on the fundamental issues," because it "involved an unusual situation where plaintiffs had
consented years earlier to an order declaring the school district 'unitary.' For that reason, the case
seems much less significant than many of the other lower court decisions addressing the termination
issue." Id. at 792 n.202.
141. See Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
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Board of Education 142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered a Georgia school system's "responsibility to prevent the reestablish-
ment of a resegregated school system.' 143 Far more cautious than the Riddick
court, the Graves court judged that thirteen years after the operation of the
court-ordered plan it was, nonetheless, " 'entirely too soon'" to relinquish the
court's jurisdiction over the case. 144 Other federal circuit courts have held that
there is an ongoing duty to rid a school system of the continuing effects of past
discrimination,145 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has itself recognized that ongoing duty. 146
One recent case, decided after Riddick, has created a basic conflict between
two federal circuit courts in their approaches to desegregation in unitary school
systems. In Dowell v. Board of Education 147 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit had to determine the effect of a unitary finding on the
desegregation of Oklahoma City's public schools. In 1972 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ordered implementation of
the "Finger Plan" to achieve desegregation.148 In 1977 the trial court in Dowell
found that the school district was unitary and entered an order terminating the
court's active supervision of the case. 14 9 When the petitioners moved to reopen
the case in 1985, the district court-relying partially on its 1977 order-denied
the motion.' 50 The district court also found that the Board's newly proposed
Student Reassignment Plan was constitutional.' 51
In Dowell the court of appeals reversed and remanded the lower court's
Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d
1070 (4th Cir. 1969).
142. 686 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1982).
143. Id. at 1144. The lower court denied a motion by the Walton County School Board to
return certain county students, who had been attending school in the city of Social Circle under'a
1968 court-ordered plan, to the county school system. The court of appeals affirmed this denial
because allowing the county School Board to implement its plan would have made the county
schools "less black and more white," and the city schools overwhelmingly black. Id. at 1143-44.
144. Id. at 1144 (quoting Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.R.D. 457, 489 (M.D. Ga.
1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 686 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1982)). Although the school system
had not achieved "unitary" status, the Graves court emphasized the continuing affirmative duty of
school boards and district courts to prevent resegregation. Id. at 1143.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1981) (when
defendant School Board "failed to eliminate the continuing system wide effects of the prior discrimi-
natory dual school system," district court's unitary finding and subsequent attempt to relinquish
jurisdiction found "clearly erroneous").
146. In Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1969), for example, the
court recognized it " 'has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future.'" Id. at 1074 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
147. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
148, Id. at 1518.
149. Id.
150. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
151. Id. at 1557. The plan that the Oklahoma City School Board proposed to replace the "Fin-
ger Plan" and the new plan's effects resembled the situation under the Norfolk School Board's vol-
untary plan. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20 (description of the Norfolk School Board's
plan); supra note 42 (effects of Norfolk School Board's plan). It eliminated busing of elementary
school students in grades one through four and reinstated neighborhood schools for those grades; it
contained a majority-to-minority transfer option and continued busing for students in grades five
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decision and allowed plaintiffs to challenge the merits of the new plan. Because
the court considered the original 1972 order a mandatory injunction, the 1977
unitary order terminating active supervision of the case did not alter the effect of
that earlier order.152 The "historical finding" of unitariness, according to the
Dowell court, did "not preclude the plaintiffs from asserting that a continuing
mandatory order is not being obeyed and that the consequences of the disobedi-
ence have destroyed the unitariness previously achieved by the district.' 1 53 In
language similar to that used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, 154 the Dowell court reasoned that "the purpose of court-ordered school
integration is not only to achieve, but also to maintain, a unitary school
system." 155
The Riddick court and the Dowell court adopted divergent approaches to
the problem of a unitary order's effect on the termination of school desegrega-
tion cases. In Riddick the court deferred to the findings of a district court that
had overseen the situation in Norfolk's school system for many years;156 in
Dowell the court overturned the district court's factual determinations on the
constitutionality of the Board's new plan.157 Whereas the Riddick court pointed
to the unitary order as the "culmination" of the desegregation process in Nor-
folk,158 the Dowell court viewed the unitary order in that case "within the pe-
numbra of the outstanding 1972 order." 159 "To do otherwise," the Dowell court
reasoned, "renders all of what has occurred since [the litigation began] moot and
mocks the painful accomplishments of sixteen years of litigation and active court
supervision."' 160 The Dowell court, in fact, expressed its outright disagreement
with the approach taken in Riddick toward the effect of a unitary order.161
through twelve. As a result, 33 of the system's 64 elementary schools would have a student popula-
tion of 90% or more of one race. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1518.
152. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519. "The plaintiffs now are simply attempting to reassert the validity
of the 1972 order and to perpetuate the duties placed upon the district." Id. at 1521.
153. Id. at 1522.
154. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
155. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1520. Furthermore, "without specifically dissolving its [original 1972]
decree, the court neither abrogated its power to enforce the mandatory order nor forgave the defend-
ants their duty to persist in the elimination of the vestiges of segregation." Id.
156. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533; see supra note 32.
157. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1522-23.
158. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530; see supra text accompanying note 138.
159. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519.
160. Id.
161. In a footnote the Dowell court had the following to say of the Riddick decision:
The Fourth Circuit has taken a different view with which we cannot agree. In Riddick the
court seems to treat a district court order terminating supervision as an order dissolving a
mandated integration plan, despite the absence of a specific order to that effect. The court
makes a bridge between a finding of unitariness and voluntary compliance with an injunc-
tion. We find no foundation for that bridge. It also appears inconsistent with Lee v. Macon
County Board of Education, in which the court held that a finding by the district court that
the school system was "unitary in nature" did not divest the court of subject matter juris-
diction of a petition to amend the desegregation plan where the court had not dismissed the
case. A finding of unitariness may lead to many other reasonable conclusions, but it can-
not divest a court of its jurisdiction, nor can it convert a mandatory injunction into volun-
tary compliance.
Id. at 1520 n.3 (citations omitted).
In November 1986 the Supreme Court refused to review Riddick and Dowell, see Board of
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In addition to offering insight into whether and how federal courts should
relinquish their control of the school desegregation process, the Riddick decision
reevaluated the effectiveness of the remedies proposed in Swann. First, the court
emphasized that the racial quotas called for in Swann were simply a starting
point. 162 Requiring the Board to justify every action it took that, like its pro-
posed plan, might affect the racial balance of Norfolk schools would make the
unitary finding "virtually meaningless in that context." 163 Although the Nor-
folk School Board's proposed plan would result in an increasing number of one-
race schools, 164 the court concurred with the Supreme Court's rationale in
Swann that the mere presence of such schools did not indicate a constitutional
violation. 165
The Riddick court most clearly departed from Swann by allowing the
Board to abolish busing of elementary students and by stating its preference for
a neighborhood pupil assignment plan. The Supreme Court in Swann had
boldly asserted the necessity of busing. 1 6 6 Only two years later, however, Justice
Powell expressed his reservations, especially with respect to the busing of ele-
mentary school children.1 67 With the Riddick decision the courts have begun to
allow curtailment of widespread busing of young children in school districts that
Education v. Dowell, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986); Riddick v. School Board, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), and has
thus left unresolved the basic difference between the two circuits over the effect of a unitary order on
a prior desegregation order. The Court also has failed to resolve the Riddick and Dowell courts'
differing approaches to allocating the burden of proof of discriminatory intent in unitary school
systems in which school boards have proposed new plans that eliminate busing. See infra note 186.
Thus, there is uncertainty over the continued use of busing, see infra note 168, as well as over the
continuing affirmative duty of school boards to desegregate unitary school systems.
162. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 536. It is worth noting too that the Riddick court applied the most
important of the six factors spelled out in Green, see supra notes 31, 55 and accompanying text, in a
suspect manner. With respect to pupil assignment, the court noted, "As a general rule the school
board had been able to keep its elementary schools within the 70%-30% guideline [for distribution
of black and white students] adopted in the early 1970's." Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533. This statement
is curious for two reasons. First, it ignores the statistical evidence of resegregation of the school
system. Id. at 541 n. 18. Second, it demonstrates the court's awareness of racial quotas despite its
arguments that such quotas were no longer important. Id. at 539.
163. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539. This argument mirrors the Supreme Court's disapproval in
Pasadena of "a continuing, rigid insistence upon some particular degree of racial balance."
Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 438.
164. See supra note 42.
165. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543. The court failed to resolve whether 12 one-race schools in a 36
school district was, in accordance with Swann, a "small number" of one-race schools. Swann, 402
U.S. at 26; see supra text accompanying note 65.
166. "All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to
assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been
deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation." Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
167. In his separate opinion in Keyes, Justice Powell attacked "compulsory student transporta-
tion [which] went well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school segregation for which
former state segregation laws were ever responsible." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 225 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Swann did not require busing of all students as a mandatory remedial
measure. Id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, Justice Powell
considered busing a "delicate issue," id. at 252 n.32 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), which demanded a balancing of the personal interests of parents and children with those of the
state. Id. at 245-49 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He concluded that the
remedy exceeded what was necessary to cure the evil of segregation, because "the full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who did not participate in any constitu-
tional violation." Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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have already been declared unitary.168
The Riddick decision also accepted "white flight" as a legitimate reason for
allowing school boards to curtail busing in a system deemed to be unitary. 169 In
a dissenting opinion in Columbus, Justice Powell warned of the resegregation
that would result from courts' "sweeping decrees" in remedying segregation in
the public schools. 170 A possible danger with the Riddick court's reasoning,
however, is the fact it failed to consider the possibility of white flight as a conve-
nient rationale for school boards with less than worthy motives. The Riddick
court isolated several discriminatory features of the Norfolk School Board's pro-
posed plan and failed to weigh the evidence cumulatively. For example, the
court found that "[t]he concept of a neighborhood school system in and of itself
is not violative of the Constitution"; 171 that "[t]he finding that a school popula-
tion is not homogeneous, standing by itself, does not, absent intent, indicate a
constitutional violation"; 172 and that "the presence of one race schools within a
community, standing alone, is not a violation of the Constitution."' 173 The Nor-
folk School Board's proposal, however, combined each of these potentially seg-
regative conditions, and the court should have considered their cumulative
effect.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did weigh the
evidence cumulatively in a school desegregation case involving the San Jose Uni-
fied School District.174 In finding a district court decision that defendant School
Board had acted without discriminatory intent "clearly erroneous," the court of
appeals ruled that "the district court erred in failing to give weight to the cumu-
lative impact of the evidence."' 175 Although a neighborhood school policy-in
and of itself-was not segregative, the court found that the closing of old schools
and the location and construction of new schools could lead to potentially segre-
gative conditions. 17 6 As a result of the cumulative weight of the evidence, "[a]n
168. The court of appeals noted that busing of students would continue for grades 7-12. Rid-
dick, 794 F.2d at 534. There are indications that other courts will allow school boards to curtail or
abandon busing. In school desegregation suits involving the United States Department of Justice,
117 school districts have been declared unitary and 47 have had their desegregation orders dismissed
by courts. Mesibov, Busing in Unitary School Districts: A Board's Right to Modify the Plan, SCHOOL
L. BULL., Fall 1986, at 19. William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division, has suggested that school boards in those districts will be able to invoke Riddick if
they choose to eliminate busing. Id.
169. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 540-41. One commentator explained the dynamics of white flight and
resegregation as "resistance by retreat and abstention rather than resistance by direct obstruction."
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 629 (1983).
170. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 483 (Powell, J., dissenting). Coincidentally, Justice Powell also an-
ticipated the other factor---community involvement-that the Riddick court recognized (calling it
"parental involvement") as a legitimate reason for the Norfolk School Board to submit its alternative
plan. Id. at 485-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2140 (1985).
175. Id. at 674.
176. Id. at 664-65.
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inescapable conclusion that the Board intended segregation emerges." 1 77 It is
plausible that the objections raised by plaintiffs in Riddick,17 8 viewed cumula-
tively, created segregative conditions and may even have constituted a showing
of an intent to create a segregated system.
Proof of discriminatory intent, after all, was the "principal issue" addressed
in the Riddick decision. In accepting the distinction between de facto and de
jure discrimination,179 the Riddick court required that-because de jure dis-
crimination was no longer present-plaintiffs prove the Board acted with dis-
criminatory intent. 180 Thus, the court held-as was required by Washington
and Arlington Heights-that discriminatory impact alone, absent a showing of
discriminatory purpose, was not sufficient to establish an equal protection viola-
tion under the Constitution.18 1 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court
overlooked the difficulties inherent in proving discriminatory intent on the part
of school authorities, who have had to make hundreds of decisions over the
course of several years,182 and refused to infer discriminatory intent. One prob-
lem with measuring motivation is that "[e]very act of a school board ... and
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be
subject to scrutiny."'18 3 The question, therefore, has arisen whether, in this area
of "governmental action which is frequently the product of compromise, of col-
lective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation,"' 84 any plaintiffs can meet the
requisite burden of proof of discriminatory intent in a school system that already
has achieved unitary status. Admittedly, the Board's plan in Riddick provided
an opportunity for judicial supervision over the equitable allocation of re-
sources.185 However, the Riddick court's requirement of proof of discrimina-
177. Id. at 675.
178. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
179. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534 n.14.
180. Id. at 528. But see Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) (holding it
proper for district courts to rest their holdings of discrimination "not on motivation or purpose, but
on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of the dual system involved"). For a discussion of
Wright, see supra note 80.
In reaching its conclusion that plaintiffs bore the burden of proof of discriminatory intent, the
Riddick court noted-and then ignored-critical factual differences between the Pasadena case,
which was the basis of its decision, and the situation in Norfolk. In one critical passage from the
Riddick decision, the court stated as follows:
We recognize some factual differences between those cases [like Pasadena], where factors
outside the school board's control such as demographic changes cause the racial composi-
tion of schools to change, and the case we consider today, where an act of the school board
in changing a part of a desegregation plan results in the shifting racial composition of the
schools. We do not take lightly this factual distinction but conclude that the plaintiffs must
be required to carry the burden of proving discriminatory intent.
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537. Thus, even though it acknowledged the discriminatory effects of official
Board actions, the Riddick court defused that critical finding by shifting the burden of proof.
181. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543. The argument ignored the possibility of allowing a prima facie
case of such a constitutional violation, a point mentioned in Swann, 402 U.S. at 18, and discussed at
greater length by Justice Powell in his opinion in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 224, 235-36 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
182. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 234 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Washington, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra note 102.
185. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 542.
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tory intent may discourage future plaintiffs with potentially legitimate
grievances from seeking judicial review. 186
Although the Riddick court upheld the district court's holding that plain-
tiffs' proof of the discriminatory impact of the Board's decisions was not suffi-
cient to establish a constitutional violation, 18 7 there was significant evidence to
support a contrary conclusion.188 In searching for discriminatory intent by
school boards, courts have been cognizant of evidence from which discrimina-
tory intent could be inferred, 189 evidence that showed foreseeable resegregative
effects of board actions, 190 and the historical background or specific sequence of
events behind a system's school desegregation efforts. 191 In contrast, the Rid-
186. In Dowell the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held-in contrast to
Riddick-that the burden of proof was not on plaintiffs to show the Oklahoma City school system
was no longer unitary. Plaintiffs had only the burden of showing the original mandatory order that
instituted the desegregation plan had been violated. The burden was on the defendant Board, in
turn, to show that this original order required modification, or alternatively, no longer required
enforcement. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1523. A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit noted "the conflict in the views of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits concerning the
burden of proof that must be borne by plaintiffs who seek changes in the administration of a school
system after the system had been declared unitary .... " United States v. Lawrence County School
Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
187. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543.
188. In his separate opinion in Keyes, Justice Powell noted the potential for inconsistent findings
because of the de jure/de facto distinction and the requirement of proof of discriminatory intent:
Yet findings even on such similar acts will, under the de jure/de facto distinction, continue
to differ, especially since the Court has never made clear what suffices to establish the
requisite "segregative intent" for an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were possible
to clarify this question, wide and unpredictable differences of opinion among judges would
be inevitable when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or "purpose," especially
when related to hundreds of decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions
over many years.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. On inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, see Diaz v. San Jose Unified School
Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985). Two years prior to
Riddick the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit itself recognized such inferences
of discriminatory intent. See Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d
324, 329 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) ("intent can be inferred from action, or inaction, in the appropriate
case").
The court's language in Goldsboro, however, foreshadowed Riddick by ignoring the possible
impact of de facto segregation:
Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent and con-
sciously operated "white haven" schools, the plaintiff has failed to show that the defend-
ant's actions directly or substantially caused the present, near-segregated state of its
schools. Thus, the plaintiff has proven neither the presence of a constitutional violation
nor the requisites for interdistrict relief.
The plaintiff has a problem. Yet, its problem is one beyond our power, in the present
state of the law, to correct [because Wayne County schools had been found unitary in
1971]. The plaintiff's problem is the result of movement from city to suburbs seen
throughout the United States and the abandonment of public schools by white, city resi-
dents seen in many communities where desegregation has occurred. We are not at present
charged with a responsibility to remedy problems caused by demography and private
racism.
Id. at 332-33.
190. Dayton, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. One year before Riddick the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit recognized that foreseeability of resegregation is "some evidence" of discrimi-
natory intent. Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 993 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Dayton, 443
U.S. at 536 n.9).
191. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267; Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663
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dick court refused to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the Norfolk
School Board 192 and approved the Board's voluntary plan despite its potential
for resegregation.193 Because "[s]tate officials are responsible for state action,
past and present"1 94 and each school district is unique, 195 evidence of the histor-
ical background of school desegregation in a system also is important in deter-
mining a school board's discriminatory intent.' 96 Nonetheless, the Riddick
court dismissed the Board's history of purposeful discrimination in the recent
past stating, "While that history of discrimination cannot and should not be
ignored, it 'cannot in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action
that is not unlawful.' "197
Brief mention of the highlights in the history of school desegregation in
Norfolk reflects the agonizing process by which black students in the system
struggled for equal educational opportunities. The first evidence of official dis-
criminatory state action was the Virginia General Assembly's pledge "to take all
appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally available to us, to
reject this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers [by the Supreme
Court in deciding Brown]."'98 The Beckett court decried a plain pattern of a
bad-faith effort by the general assembly to defeat Brown.199
(9th Cir. 1984) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985); see
also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court consid-
ered several factors bearing on proof of discriminatory intent, including historical background and
specific sequence of events leading to school board decisions).
192. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 542-43.
193. Id. at 527; see supra note 42.
194. Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983).
195. Id. at 227; Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985).
196. Just how important such a historical background of segregation can be is seen in the most
recent chapter of school desegregation in Denver. In Keyes v. School Dist. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D.
Colo. 1985), the district court denied a motion by defendant School Board to have the Denver school
system declared unitary. Reading the Pasadena decision in light of Green, Swann, Dayton, and
Columbus, the court noted that Pasadena was a narrow decision. There was adequate evidence of
discriminatory effects resulting from official Board actions in Denver to hold that the school system
(13 years after the Supreme Court's decision in Keyes) had still failed to eliminate segregation. Id. at
1516-17.
197. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)).
198. Beckett v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957). The rationale for this resistance to Brown was clear from a resolution of
the Virginia General Assembly:
The General Assembly declares, finds and establishes as a fact that the mixing of white and
colored children in any elementary or secondary public school within any county, city or
town of the Commonwealth constitutes a clear and present danger affecting and endanger-
ing the health and welfare of the children and citizens residing in such county, city or town
and that no efficient system of elementary and secondary public schools can be maintained
in any county, city or town in which white and colored children are taught in any such
school located therein.
Id. at 437. See generally Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45
VA. L. REV. 517, 53941 (1959) (discussing efforts of the Virginia General Assembly to block imple-
mentation of Brown).
Resistance from white parents followed the court's decision in Beckett. The schools did not
open on time in September 1958, see J. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD
ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 73-75 (1976), and a referendum in
November 1958 further demonstrated white resistance, id. at 79-80.
199. Beckett, 148 F. Supp. at 445-46.
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In Brewer v. School Board2 00 the court of appeals found that the Board's
guiding principles in developing a desegregation plan were that "pupils tend to
do better in schools with a predominantly middle class milieu; white pupils are
generally middle class, and black pupils are generally in a lower socio-economic
class; therefore, to maintain a predominantly middle class milieu, a school must
have a clear majority of white children.12 0 1 This offensive scheme, the court
found, would result in the "antithesis" of a unitary system: the exclusion of
blacks from racially integrated schools. 202 After the case was remanded in light
of Swann, the Norfolk School Board's failure to provide free bus transportation
to disadvantaged black children was viewed by the court as a "futile gesture"
2 0 3
and a "cruel hoax."'20 4 In the assessment of two judges reviewing the record in
1970,
This litigation has been frustratingly interminable, not because of insu-
perable difficulties of implementation but because of the unpardonable
recalcitrance of the defendants. The new, and spurious, "principles"
devised by the Board and endorsed by the [concurring] Judge as justifi-
cation for the failure to desegregate fly in the face of Brown ... and are
simply new rationalizations for perpetuating illegal segregation.
2 05
Furthermore, the record of the Norfolk litigation suggests that the School
Board, when it filed and voluntarily dismissed its civil action to get the neighbor-
hood school plan approved, 20 6 exerted pressure on a woman whom it named as
class representative. 20 7
200. 434 F.2d 408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
201. Id. at 411.
202. Id.
203. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
204. Id. at 947. The Board also asked that the same disadvantaged plaintiffs not be awarded
attorneys' fees. Over defendant Board's objections, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover fees. See
id. at 948-52. It is possible that the expense of litigation may have been a factor in the Beckett
plaintiffs' decision not to challenge the 1975 unitary order.
205. Brewer, 434 F.2d at 414 (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
207. In Bell v. School 13d., 734 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that the Norfolk
School Board, by filing its action against her, had tried to deter her from speaking out against the
Board's plan. The court upheld the district court's finding that the Board had no "evil motive" in
bringing the suit. Id. at 157.
The Board had sent a letter to Mrs. Bell, the text of which is as follows:
"Because you have made known your views on the subject and you have publicly stated
your opposition to the implementation of the plan, you and your child Marcus have been
selected as defendants who would be representative of the legal class of parents and stu-
dents who would be opposed to the implementation of this plan."
Id. at 156 (quoting letter from Norfolk School Board to Mrs. Marcus Bell).
In a concurring opinion Senior Circuit Judge Rosenn analyzed the situation that had led to the
suit:
In the early 1970's, the School Board of the City of Norfolk-pursuant to court or-
der-began to bus many of its 54,000 students in an effort to desegregate the school dis-
trict. By 1982, however, the widespread skepticism concerning the wisdom of busing had
found its way to Norfolk. The School Board therefore sponsored a series of public fora
designed to elicit the thoughts of citizens whose families would be affected by a plan to
significantly curtail the use of busing. Carolyn Bell, a black woman with an eight year old
son, availed herself of the Board's invitation to share her apprehensions about the plan, and
evidently did so in an intelligent, articulate, and effective manner. For her contribution to
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Other courts have looked more carefully at historical background and have
found discriminatory intent from strong evidence of the segregative effects of
such actions. The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Arlington Heights,
Columbus, and Dayton, as did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Ross and Diaz. The Riddick court more or less ignored past official
acts despite its recognition that they were "relevant" to a current finding of
discriminatory intent by the Board.20 8
One reason the Riddick court's ahistorical approach nonetheless represents
a culmination of, rather than a radical departure from, previous desegregation
decisions may be that the objectives of federal courts have changed gradually
since the 1950s. At first, the goal was tangible and achievable: the "elimination
of a variety of obstacles" to achieving desegregation in America's public
schools. 20 9 In Swann the Supreme Court's objective still was "to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 210 As school de-
segregation became a national problem, the goal was to achieve "an integrated
school system in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be confident that
racial discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated. '211 By the 1980s the
Riddick court's objective was to prevent resegregation in a school system that
"historically practiced de jure segregation but had obtained a valid judicial order
that it [had] ridded itself of all vestiges of that racial discrimination. '212
Although the elimination of segregation was an achievable goal, the situa-
tion in Norfolk suggests the goal of avoiding resegregation may not be. The
phenomenon of "white flight" occurred because of busing;213 however, the pro-
posed solution would lead to a higher number of one-race schools. 214 Although
the community discussion, Mrs. Bell was rewarded with a letter informing her that she and
her son-who had very little to say about the issue-had been named defendants in a
lawsuit.
I can readily understand how Mrs. Bell, untutored in the niceties of the law, might
have felt threatened by the lawsuit to the extent of being reluctant to speak quite as freely
with the suit hanging over her head as she would have been without it. The School Board's
response-that it was in fact doing Mrs. Bell a favor by "providing her with a much
stronger podium from which to express her opposition to the plan"-seems to me to reflect
a striking insensitivity to the practical consequences of its actions. Hauling someone into
court, even in a representative capacity, can hardly be said to be the most benevolent of
actions.
Id. at 158 (Rosenn, J., concurring). This episode in the Norfolk school desegregation litigation is but
one small example of the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs who must prove discriminatory intent
by a school board. See supra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
208. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539.
209. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown 11).
210. Swan, 402 U.S. at 15.
211. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534.
213. In Riddick expert witnesses testified that Norfolk's school population would be 75% black
by 1987, id. at 526, and that Norfolk schools would eventually become over 90% black as had
happened to the school systems in Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Richmond, id. at 528.
One scholar has noted that white flight is demonstrative of a paradox: although civil rights
activists in Virginia marshalled support from the federal government for school desegregation, there
nonetheless has been a failure "to arouse any sustained and broad public commitment" to desegrega-
tion. J. EiY, supra note 198, at 201.
214. See supra note 42.
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the court boldly declared that the Norfolk school system had become unitary in
1975, when the district court was satisfied with a system "free from racial segre-
gation, 215 its application of issue preclusion may foreclose future litigation at a
time when attendance patterns in the schools may be "such as to once again
manifest substantial aspects of a segregated system."2 1 6 Courts should interpret
the Riddick decision, therefore, in light of such broad goals as "basic fair-
ness"2 17 and "the best possible educational opportunity for all children. 21 8 At
the very least, the desegregation decisions require that a unitary system, and not
any proposed plan, is the end to be achieved.2 19
The federal courts should also require school boards to achieve and main-
tain the goal of a unitary system in light of historical developments. Part of that
history was the Supreme Court's 1954 mandate that education, so important to a
democratic society, "is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." 220 The Riddick court recognized that a history of discrimination,
although not dispositive, is relevant to courts' determination of a school board's
intent.2 21 Should a board's actions ever repeat the errors of the past, or in any
way become so "disquieting" 222 as to raise a presumption of discriminatory in-
tent, the federal courts must have the broadest discretion to heal a constitutional
breach. Although courts may legitimately return the control of unitary school
systems to well-intentioned local authorities, they must also remember the leg-
acy that made Brown and subsequent school desegregation decisions necessary.
215. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530.
216. Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 31.
218. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in its 1985 Keyes decision, dis-
cussed the goal of equal educational opportunity as it is viewed by the opposing parties in school
desegregation litigation:
The parties approach the issues and evidence in this case from different perspectives reflect-
ing differing interpretations of the scope of the equal protection clause. Perhaps, as with
visual perspectives, the difference is influenced by the relative positions of the parties. The
Board of Education looks at the case from the high ground occupied by those holding the
power of governance. In that position there may be a tendency to accept a more static
overview of a somewhat distant scene characterized by stability and serenity. The plain-
tiffs/intervenors represent people whose historical disadvantages give them an alternative
viewpoint. For those who are still deep in the valley, struggling for survival, and for those
moving upward on the mountain, educational opportunity is the path to progress. They
are on the move, seeing only transient scenery, and their primary concern is the direction
of their movement. Is the trail going forward and upward, or downward and backward?
Keyes v. School Dist. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Colo. 1985).
219. For example, in Green the Supreme Court held, "[A]II we decide today is that in desegre-
gating a dual system a plan utilizing 'freedom of choice' is not an end in itself." Green, 391 U.S. at
440.
220. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. For reflections on the 30 years of school desegregation efforts
since Brown I, see Branton, The History and Future of School Desegregation, 109 F.R.D. 241 (1986);
Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Courts' Abandonment of Brown v. Board of
Education, 26 WM & MARY L. REV. 7 (1984); Hall & Henderson, Brown Revisited: Charting a New
Direction, 9 BLACK L.J. 6 (1984); Reynolds, Individualism vs Group Rights: Tie Legacy of Brown,
93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984).
221. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539.
222. Id. at 543. The Riddick court defined what it would consider "disquieting": "We do not
think this is a case in which a school board, upon obtaining a judicial decision that it is unitary, turns
its back on the rights of its minority students and reverts to its old discriminating ways." Id.
1987]
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To do otherwise would reverse over thirty years of progress toward the realiza-
tion of equal educational opportunities for all of America's public school
children.
MITCHELL F. DUCEY
